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A commentary on
Affective coding: the emotional dimension of agency
by Gentsch, A., and Synofzik, M. (2014). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:608. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00608
We welcome Gentsch and Synofzik’s (2014) review of the role of affect in modulating a person’s
sense of agency (SoA). The review is timely and synthesizes a great deal of evidence. However, we
feel that their claims concerning the role of affect in modulating a person’s SoA could be usefully
extended to the study of auditory hallucinations (AH), one unusual experience not discussed in
their review. In this commentary, we describe recent findings that suggest that one way in which
negative affect plays a role in the development of AH is by reducing the SoA associated with self-
generated cognitions and suggest that the insula may play an important role in mediating the effect
of affect on SoA.
Cognitive models of AH (e.g., Bentall, 1990; Waters et al., 2012) suggest that they occur when a
cognition is misattributed to an external, non-self-source. Consistent with this claim, people who
experience AH tend to show a bias toward accepting the presence of a verbal stimulus on tasks
designed to measure reality discrimination (i.e., they tend to confuse internal, self-generated events
for external, non-self-generated events, but not vice versa; Brookwell et al., 2013). This is often
demonstrated using an auditory signal detection task (SDT), in which participants must try to
detect speech in an ambiguous auditory stimulus (typically white noise). On trials where the speech
is absent, participants have the opportunity to make a false alarm; that is, to report that speech
was present in the white noise, when it was not. Presumably, when participants make a false alarm,
they have mistaken their internal representation of the speech for the externally presented, “real”
speech.
Two recent studies have demonstrated a causal relation between increases in negative affect
and weaker reality discrimination. Smailes et al. (2014) reported that participants who per-
formed an auditory SDT after completing a negative mood induction (recalling an unpleasant
autobiographical memory) made more false alarms, but not more hits, than did participants
who performed the task after completing a neutral mood induction. Similarly, Hoskin et al.
(2014), despite employing a different mood induction and a modified SDT, reported that par-
ticipants were more likely to make false alarms during a condition in which they were exposed
to a stressor than during a control condition. Thus, both studies showed that when partici-
pants experienced negative affect, they were more likely to misattribute internal, self-generated
cognitions to an external source. These findings are consistent with data from studies that
have shown that negative affect tends to precede the onset of AH in the daily lives of psy-
chosis patients (Nayani and David, 1996; Delespaul et al., 2002), and suggest that negative affect
is associated with the onset of AH, at least in part, because it modulates SoA for cognition.
Smailes et al. Affect, agency, and auditory hallucinations
Gentsch and Synofzik propose that three stages of agency
processing—prospective, immediate, and retrospective—exist.
First person accounts (e.g., Romme et al., 2009; Scholtus and
Blanke, 2012) suggest that people who experience AH do not go
through a deliberative process to determine whether an unusual
auditory percept was self-generated, or was a result of an external,
non-self agent. Instead, an AH is experienced “in the moment” as
something that was not self-generated. Thus, in terms of Gentsch
and Synofzik’s proposed stages, it seems likely that the effect of
negative emotions on a person’s reality discrimination abilities
would correspond to either prospective or immediate affective
coding, rather than retrospective affective coding. That is, neg-
ative affect may reduce a person’s SoA over cognition by inter-
fering with action planning or with the generation of an accurate
sensory outcome representation of a cognition. The most promi-
nent cognitivemodels of AH suggest that a forwardmodel system
acts to predict the sensory outcomes of motor commands, and
that dysfunction at one of a number of comparators can lead to
a lack of agency over self-generated actions (Jones and Ferny-
hough, 2007). Interference with either action planning or accu-
rate prediction could therefore lead to external misattributions of
self-generated processes. A potential avenue for research would
be to investigate whether negative affect can modulate, for exam-
ple, the sensory attenuation which is associated with successful
prediction via forward modeling.
Gentsch and Synofzik’s review only briefly discusses the
brain regions that may be involved in mediating the effects of
negative affect on SoA. At two points, however, they cite evi-
dence suggesting that damage to/atypical activity in the insula
can lead to disorders of SoA. We concur that the insula is a
good candidate for mediating the effects of negative affect on
SoA. This is because, in addition to the evidence cited by Gentsch
and Synofzik, a number of studies have shown (a) that different
agency experiences are associated with changes in insula activity
(e.g., Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003), (b) that insula
activity is atypical in people who report AH (Wylie and Tregel-
las, 2010) and (c) that increases in negative affect are associated
with changes in insula activity (Phan et al., 2002; Harrison et al.,
2008). Research that examines whether negative affect brings
about reductions in a person’s SoA over their cognitions through
modulation of activity in the insula is required.
Demonstrating that affective problems may play an impor-
tant role in the development of AH is important for a number
of reasons. First, affect-induced changes in the SoA a person
has over their cognitions can help to explain why AH are typi-
cally not experienced constantly (this issue is sometimes raised
as a problem for cognitive models of AH; Gallagher, 2004).
Seconds, and perhaps more importantly, it opens up the pos-
sibility of novel therapeutic interventions. While the primary
focus of such interventions may be on ameliorating the affec-
tive problems reported by people who hear voices, they may
indirectly reduce the frequency of AH by preventing nega-
tive affect-induced modulations of a person’s SoA over their
cognitions.
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